SOME ASPECTS OF THE STRUCTURE OF A LEXICON ENTRY

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My primary aim in this paper is to provide an analysis of some aspects of word meaning both independent of and dependent on the context.

The necessity of reconsidering questions of the word meaning independent of the context has become apparent through the results of language philosophical research of recent years, while a reconsideration of the analysis of word meaning dependent on the context is a necessity resulted by findings of textlinguistic/texttheoretical research. It is a confrontation of the results of these two research fields which renders it possible to answer such basic questions as e.g. the following ones:
(a) What is the very nature of ‘word meaning’? (b) Is it expedient and necessary to distinguish between lexicon and encyclopaedia, and if the answer is positive, how to do it? (c) What kind of a relation exists between the lexicon of a language (and a general encyclopaedia) and a text-specific lexicon (and a text-specific encyclopaedia)? (d) How should the optimal macro and micro structure of a lexicon entry be set up? (e) How is it possible (how is it expedient) to define the concept ‘lexicon item’ (using another terminology: ‘lemma’)?

My paper is built up as follows:

1. Aspects of word meaning
2. Lexicon, encyclopaedia, text-specific knowledge-system
3. The structure of a lexicon entry in general
4. Some aspects of a text-specific lexicon entry
5. Possible ways of defining the concept ‘lexicon item’.
1. *Aspects of word meaning*

When analyzing the different aspects of word meaning, it is usual to distinguish between *system words* and *text words*, i.e. between the words of a given language as elements of the system of this particular language, and the different occurrences of these words in different texts. My analysis of questions concerning word meaning will be based on this distinction.

1.1. The problems involved in the investigation of word meaning have wide ramifications and the literature on this topic is very extensive. I will deal here with only the most relevant aspects. Let us take the so-called ‘triangle of signification’ (sometimes referred to as the ‘semiotic triangle’) as a starting point (cf. Lyons 1968: 404, shown here as Figure 1).

![Diagram of the semiotic triangle](image)

*The semiotic triangle*

*Figure 1*

This representation with a slight alteration in terminology mirrors the views of the medieval grammarians which Lyons characterizes as follows:

As the distinction was formulated by the medieval grammarians: the form of a word (the *vox*-part of a *dictio*) signified ‘things’
by virtue of the ‘concept’ associated with the form of the word in the minds of the speakers of the language; and the ‘concept’, looked at from this point of view, was the meaning of the word (its significatio). (LYONS, 1968: 403-404).

The terminological alteration involves the more general term ‘referent’ used by Lyons to replace the original term ‘thing’ in the semiotic triangle.

1.2. Recently, discussions about the aspects of word meaning have been centered around some basic questions, two of which are the following: (i) what the real nature of the meaning is and (ii) whether or not signifying things really takes place by virtue of the concept; in other words, whether or not the concept (or in other terminology: the sense, the intension) determines the referent (in other terminology: the extension, the extralinguistic correlate).

With reference to this discussion, I want to tackle Putnam’s view which seems to me to entail the most far-reaching consequences 1.

1.2.1. The views of language philosophers concerning these questions have been characterized by Putnam in the following way:

The doctrine that the meaning of a term is a concept carried the implication that meanings are mental entities. Frege, however, rebelled against this ‘psychologism’. Feeling that meanings are public property — that the same meaning can be ‘grasped’ by more than one person and by persons at different times — he identified concepts (and hence ‘intensions’ or meanings) with abstract enti-

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1 When dealing with Putnam’s view, I am relying on PUTNAM (1978) instead of PUTNAM (1975) which I have always referred to in my work on word meaning until now (cf. e.g. PETÖFI (1976), (1982), and NEUBAUER-PETÖFI (1981)). I want to thank my colleague W. Heydrich for recommending this excellent summarizing study of Putnam.
ties rather than mental entities. However, 'grasping' these abstract entities was still an individual psychological act. [...] Secondly, the timeworn example of the two terms 'creature with a kidney' and 'creature with a heart' does show that two terms can have the same extension and yet differ in intension. But it was taken to be obvious that the reverse is impossible (two terms cannot differ in extension and have the same intension). Interestingly, no argument for this impossibility was ever offered. Probably it reflects the tradition of the ancient and medieval philosophers, who assumed that the concept corresponding to a term was just a conjunction of predicates, and hence that the concept corresponding to a term must always provide a necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term. [...] So theory of meaning came to rest on two unchallenged assumptions:

(1) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (in the sense of 'psychological states', in which states of memory and belief are 'psychological states', no one thought that knowing the meaning of a word as a continuous state of consciousness, of course).

(2) That the meaning of a term determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension).

I shall argue that these two assumptions are not jointly satisfied by any notion, let alone any notion of meaning. The traditional concept of meaning is a concept which rests on a false theory. (PUTNAM, 1978: 61-62).

According to Putnam, word meaning cannot be treated adequately without a socio-linguistic hypothesis, an aspect which has not yet been accounted for to the extent it deserves to be. He calls this hypothesis Hypothesis of the universality of the division of linguistic labour:

Every linguistic community exemplifies the [...] division of linguistic labour [...] ; that is, it possesses at least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets. (PUTNAM, 1978: 67).
He exemplifies this hypothesis by, among others, the word ‘gold’ in the following way:

every one to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word ‘gold’; but he does not have to acquire the method of recognizing whether something is or not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name — necessary and sufficient conditions for memberships in the extension, ways of recognizing whether something is in the extension, etc. — are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the ‘labour’ of knowing and employing these various parts of the ‘meaning’ of ‘gold’. (PUTNAM, 1978: 66).

Putnam maintains that a word bears to its referent (extension) in most cases the relation of indexicality.

Words like ‘water’ have an unnoticed indexical component; ‘water’ is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the water around here. Water at another time or in another place or even in another possible world has to bear the relation sameL to our ‘water’ in order to be water. Thus the theory that (1) words have ‘intensions’ which are something like concepts associated with the words by speakers; and (2) intension determines extension — cannot be true of natural-kind words like ‘water’ for the same reason it cannot be true of obviously indexical words like ‘I’. (PUTNAM, 1978: 71).

To postulate indexicality appears to be just another way of making the same point that Kripke makes in postulating rigid designation.

Kripke calls a designator ‘rigid’ (in a given sentence) if (in that sentence) it refers to the same individual in every possible world in which the designator designates. If we extend this notion of rigidity to substance names, then we may express Kripke’s theory and mine by saying that the term ‘water’ is rigid. (PUTNAM, 1978: 68-69).
The aim of Putnam's analysis is to show that

the extension of a term is not fixed by a concept that the individual speaker has in his head, and this is true both because extension is, in general, determined socially — there is division of linguistic labour as much as of 'real' labour — and because extension is, in part, determined indexically. *The extension of our terms depends upon the actual nature of the particular things that serve paradigms, and this actual nature is not, generally, fully known to the speaker* (Underlining by me) (Putnam, 1978: 71).

According to Putnam, two plausible assumptions arise from this analysis:

— to retain the identification of meaning with concept and pay the price of giving up the idea that meaning determines extension; and [...]  
— to identify 'meaning' with an ordered pair (or possibly an ordered n-tuple) of entities, one which is the extension [...]. Doing this makes it trivially true that meaning determines extension (i.e. difference in extension is *ipso facto* difference in meaning), but totally abandons the idea that if there is a difference in the meaning [...], then there must be some difference in our concepts (or in our psychological state). (Putnam, 1978: 72).

Putnam keeps the second assumption, and proposes as to the representation of word meaning that

the normal form description of the meaning of a word should be a finite sequence, or 'vector', whose components should certainly include the following (it might be desirable to have other types of components as well): (1) the syntactic markers that apply to the word, e.g. 'noun'; (2) the semantic markers that apply to the word, e.g. 'animal', 'period of time'; (3) a description of the additional features of the stereotype, if any; (4) a description of the extension.  
The following convention is a part of this proposal: the components of the vector all represent a hypothesis about the individual
speaker's competence, except the extension. Thus the normal form description for 'water' might be, in part:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syntactic markers</th>
<th>Semantic markers</th>
<th>Stereotype</th>
<th>Extension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mass noun, concrete</td>
<td>natural kind; liquid</td>
<td>colourless; transparent; tasteless; thirst-quenching etc.</td>
<td>H₂O (give or take impurities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This does not mean that the knowledge of the fact that water is H₂O is being imputed to the individual speaker or even to the society. It means that (we say) the extension of the term 'water' as they (the speakers in question) use it is in fact H₂O. [...] although we have to use a description of the extension to give the extension, we think of the component in question as being the extension (the set), not the description of the extension. (PUTNAM, 1978: 79-80).

I also consider it necessary to quote briefly his remarks on the 'semantic markers' and the 'stereotype':

Not only do such features as 'animal', 'living thing', 'artifact', 'day of the week', 'period of time', attach with enormous centrality to the words 'tiger', 'clam', 'chair', 'Tuesday', 'hours'; but they also form part of a widely used and important system of classification. The centrality guarantees that items classified under these headings virtually never have to be reclassified; thus these headings are the natural ones to use as category-indicators in a host of contexts. It seems to me reasonable that [...] in semantics these category-indicators should be used as markers. [...] In ordinary parlance, a 'stereotype' is a conventional (frequently malicious) idea (which may be wildly inaccurate) of what an X looks like or acts like or is. [...] The stereotype for gold, for example, contains the feature yellow even though chemically pure gold is nearly white. But the gold we see in jewelry is typically yellow (due to the presence of copper), so the presence of this feature in the stereotype is even useful in lay contexts (PUTNAM, 1978: 76-78).
He summarizes:

This proposal means that we keep assumption (2) of our early discussion. Meaning determines extension — by construction, so to speak. But (1) is given up; the psychological state of the individual speaker does not determine ‘what he means’ (Putnam, 1978: p. 80).

1.2.2. Though I agree with Putnam concerning his view on word meaning, our conceptions as to the representation of word meaning are divergent.

The core of the problem for me lies in Putnam’s claim that «we have to use a description of the extension to give the extension». If the extension itself has to be a component of the meaning of a word — and Putnam has no doubt about this —, the extension cannot be replaced by a description of the extension in the representation of the meaning. A description — even in the form of H₂O — is a verbal expression, which has its own meaning. How should this meaning be understood?

If the extension must be a component of the meaning, it must be a component of the meaning-representation too. But how can we imagine this? How is it possible to indicate the indexicality of the words (or to use the terminology of Kripke: the fact that words are rigid designators) in the meaning-representation? What should stand in the meaning representation instead of the extension — if it is obvious that the extension itself cannot stand there?

How would Putnam have specified the extension of the word ‘water’ in 1750? How to understand the statement that «the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H₂O on Earth in 1750 as in 1950?» (Putnam, 1978: 63). It seems to me that ‘H₂O’ given as the extension in the meaning representation of ‘water’ must not be considered as an expression of the chemical language, but rather as an entity having no meaning in itself, performing/indicating the only function of replacing the goal-object of the deictic act to which the first
user of the word 'water' has pointed when expressing this word. (Or, to adjust Kripke's terminology, the substitute/indicator of the entity designated in a rigid way by the word 'water'). Since the fact that in 1750 «the typical Earthian speaker of English did not know that water consisted of hydrogen and oxygen» (PUTNAM, 1978: 63) only means that in 1750 the principle of the division of linguistic labour did not apply to the word 'water' in the sense that there existed experts who on the basis of their chemical knowledge as to H$_2$O, could have stated with certainty a substance called 'water' was in fact water or not. However, if H$_2$O is not the extension, what is it?

I would suggest the following solution to this problem:

— One should provide a symbol — not a part of the expert knowledge! — as the extension component of the word meaning representation, the function of which is not to represent but to replace/indicate the extension.

— The stereotype component should be divided into two parts: one part representing the stereotype concerning non-experts, and one part concerning experts (competent in different technical branches). It seems to me to be legitimate to also speak of stereotypes with respect to experts, since expert knowledge can also undergo change; the difference between non-expert and expert stereotypes is not a substantial but only a gradual one. 

1.3. On the basis of the foregoing analysis the semiotic triangle in Figure 1 can be replaced by the pair of triangles in Figure 2.

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2 As to different discussions of this view in different connections, cf. e.g. EIKMEYER (1982).

3 I have elsewhere been concerned with the revision of the semiotic triangle. The last paper in which I have dealt with it was PETÖFI (1983c). The pair of semiotic triangles in Figure 2 in my present paper is a corrected and revised version of the last mentioned one.
The level indicated by the symbol ‘Se’ is the so-called semiotic level, while ‘CPs’ stands for the cognitive psychological level. $F_0$ and $C_0$ are to be understood as two fragments of reality, more precisely formulated: $F_0$ indicates a given written or sounding physical object (formativum originale), $C_0$ indicates any arbitrary fragment of reality (correlatum originale). $S$ is none other than a counterpart of $C_0$ on the cognitive psycho-

![Semiotic triangles](image)

Figure 2

logical level, independent of its coming into being as the apperceptive image of $C_0$ or as a piece of knowledge activated by the perceptive image ($F_p$) of $F_0$. $S$ is a non-verbal $/\neq S_{\text{IL}}$/ or a verbal $/\neq S_{L_j}$/ configuration; the symbol ‘$L$’ refers to a language in general, while the symbol ‘$L_j$’ refers to a particular language $L_j$. The triangle $F_0C_0S$ corresponds to the semiotic triangle in Figure 1 (where $F_0$ corresponds to the Form, $C_0$...
to the Referent, and \( S \) to the Meaning (Concept). To formulate it in a simplified way, \( S + C_0 \) corresponds to the reformulated Putnamean meaning (\( S \) corresponds to the semantic marker, and the stereotype or expert knowledge, while \( C_0 \) corresponds to the extension). The relation existing between \( F_0 \) and \( C_0 \) is that postulated by Putnam as the indexical relation, by Kripke as the rigid-designation relation.

We can create the triangle of the meaning-representation from this semiotic triangle by transforming \( F_p \) and \( S \) into physical semiotic objects (representations; cf. FR and SR), and replacing (not representing!) \( C_0 \) by an entity indicating it (correlate indicator cf. CI).

It is the entirety of the relations \( F_0-C_0, F_0-S, \) and \( C_0-S \) that corresponds to the element Word in Figure 1 in the semiotic triangle \( F_0C_0S \), while in the triangle of the representation it is the entirety of the relations FR-CI, FR-SR, and CI-SR that corresponds to the representation of the Word. Since \( S \) itself can have different states and can be of different complexity, this also holds for SR: e.g. in the case of the word ‘table’, \( S \) can be a picture of a table, it can be the global property, ‘being a table’ (implicite sense), however, it can also be the set of properties replacing/explicating the global property ‘being a table’ (explicating sense). Accordingly, SR can also be of different character.

If we use the term ‘signification’ in the appropriately extended sense according to the reformulated Putnamean meaning, the elements and (implicit or explicit) relations represented in Figure 2 can be summarized as follows (cf. Table 1, where the Symbol ‘ \( S \) ’ used without a prefix can be understood both as ‘i-S’ and as ‘e-S’; the subscripts ‘den’, ‘des’, ‘sig’, ‘exp’, and ‘cor’ stand on that side of the sign, on which the element of the relation ending with ‘-ans’, ‘ens’ stand).
1.4. The semiotic triangles of Figure 2 are to be interpreted according to whether we consider a word of a given language as an element of the *system* of this language, or as an occurrence in a given *text*[^4]. This difference is first of all relevant with respect to $S$ (and, accordingly, to $SR$).

If we consider a word to be an element of the system of a given language, $S$ is to be considered as the knowledge, which the members of the language community speaking this language *collectively* possess (which is an element of the ‘collective consciousness’ of this language community). In this case, $SR$ is to be understood accordingly.

**TABLE 1**

*Elements:*

- $F_o = \text{Formativum originale (Significans; Denotans; Designans)}$
- $C_o = \text{Correlatum originale (Denotatum/Designandum)}$
- $F_p = \text{Formativum perceptum}$
- $S = \text{Sensus (Designatum/Designandum)}$
- $S_{IL} = \text{Sensus non-verbalis}$
- $S_{LJ} = \text{Sensus verbalis}$
- $i-S = \text{Sensus implicitus [sensus explicandus]}$
- $e-S = \text{Sensus explicans}$
- $S_{0b} = \text{Significatio originalis}$
- $[\text{Significatum/Significandum originale: } \{C_o, S\}]$
- $FR = \text{Formativum repræsentatum}$
- $SR = \text{Sensus repræsentatus}$
- $CI = \text{Correlatum-Indicator}$
- $SiR = \text{Significatio repræsentata: } \{CI, SR\}$

*Relations:*

- Relatio *denotationis*: $F_o_{\text{den}} = C_o$
- Relatio *designationis*: $F_o_{\text{des}} = S$
- Relatio *explicationis*: $i-S = e_S$
- Relatio *corresponsionis stereotypicae*: $S_{\text{cor}} = C_o$
- Relatio *significationis*: $F_o_{\text{sig}} = \{C_o, S\}$

[^4]: Regarding this differentiation it is usual to use the terms ‘system word’ and ‘text word’, and/or to mean that a word in a lexicon (e.g. a system word) *denotes*, while an occurrence (a text word) *refers to* an object/state-of-affairs. Cf. also Lyons (1977).
If we consider a word to be an occurrence in a given text, S is to be considered as the knowledge, which is an element of the knowledge of the person concerning the given context using this word in the given context. Whether this knowledge is really a part of the knowledge of the person concerning the given context or whether it is only the interpreter who thinks that it is, has no theoretical importance. From a theoretical point of view, it is not important either whether this knowledge corresponds to a non-expert stereotype, to some expert stereotype, or to some combination of these. Those questions are important on one hand from the point of view of the representation of SR, on the other hand from the point of view of text interpretation.

As to the occurrence of a word in a text, it is also a relevant question, whether S can/should be considered as something else than knowledge in a verbal form, e.g. as a picture, or as some mental manifestation of something that cannot fully be formulated in a verbal form.

Neither the adequate and explicit description of denotation nor of referring can be considered an easy task. However, one must strive to solve (or at least to try to solve) this task, since the consequences of the philosophical discussion concerning word meaning have far-reaching consequences for lexicography as well as for interpretation, and almost nothing has yet been done in this direction.

2. *Lexicon, encyclopaedia, text-specific knowledge-system*

With respect to revealing the meaning of a text, it is the explicative interpretation that plays the primary role. Even in those cases where we have references from the author of the text as to his intention with respect to the given text (as to what he intended to express with this text, or how to understand this or that part of the text), these references also need to be
interpreted. Thus, I want to briefly analyze the connection of word meaning and text meaning from the angle of the interpreter. (When I speak of explicative interpretation, I mean only the interpretation by means of which the meaning of texts be revealed; I want to leave out of consideration the aspects of the explanatory and evaluative interpretation of texts).

One of the main components of word meaning is, as we have seen in the previous section, the ‘knowledge’ assigned to a given word by the non-expert and the expert members of the language community. It also has to be mentioned that this ‘knowledge’ changes over time, thus word meaning means, if we want to specify it adequately, word meaning with reference to a socio-cultural context specified in space and time. This statement also applies to the meaning of more complex language expressions, although the case is naturally more complex here.

2.1. When we analyze the structure of the knowledge which plays a role in interpreting meaning, it is expedient to differentiate between the following three sorts of knowledge: (a) the knowledge assigned to the single words of a language by the non-expert and expert members of the language community, (b) the knowledge assigned to a text (to the single words of a text) by the interpreter of that given text, and finally (c) the knowledge manifesting itself in a model (in the single words of a model) constructed by a given interpreter for the purpose of the interpretation of a given text. In other words: the knowledge, possessed by the language community collectively, the knowledge which in the opinion of the interpreter manifests itself in the text to be interpreted, and, finally, the knowledge the interpreter himself possesses concerning the represented/constructed states of affairs in the text. From these three sorts of knowledge only the first one can be systematized, the remaining two can only by represented in relation to this systematized knowledge.
2.2. As to the systematized knowledge of the language community, it is expedient to make a further distinction. It is useful to treat the language knowledge of the language community in question separately from the knowledge that can be considered as common knowledge of all language communities. One can characterize the first as the language knowledge concerning different object-classes and classes of potential states of affairs; e.g. to know, objects for which object-classes are denoted by the English words 'bread', 'ratio', 'club', 'spirit', etc. on one hand and to know on the other hand states of affairs of which classes of potential states of affairs are denoted by the English expressions 'someone swims', 'something swims', 'someone hears something', 'someone listens to something', etc. In the following discussion, I will call the systematic totality of this knowledge the Lexicon. One can characterize the second sort of knowledge as knowledge concerning different individual objects and individual states of affairs — represented by means of the language in question. Individual objects are e.g. Westminster Abbey, the cathedral of Milano, Shakespeare, Michelangelo, the Holy Spirit, etc., while individual states of affairs are e.g. the battle of Borodino, the founding of Rome, the Lateran Council, etc. In what follows, I will call the systematic totality of this knowledge the Encyclopaedia.

2.3. The knowledge manifest in the words of a particular text can be classified into four clearly distinguishable types: on one hand the full or partial manifestation of the knowledge that is assigned to some particular words of the given text in the Lexicon or in the Encyclopaedia, on the other hand the text-specific idiosyncratic lexicon or encyclopaedic type of knowledge that should be assigned to the other words of the given text. The most varied combinations of these clear types are not only imaginable, they can, in fact, be found in different kinds of texts.
2.4. The knowledge manifest in the different interpreter-specific models is analogous to the knowledge that manifests itself in the texts, thus this type of knowledge can also be classified into the above mentioned four clear types, and also these types can also be combined with each other in any possible ways.

2.5. I want to especially point out the complex relationships between these three sorts of knowledge. The collective knowledge of a language community as well as the knowledge that can be considered as common to all language communities, more exactly, the systematization of this knowledge, generally comes into being by extracting information out of texts. At the same time, the individual interpreters have, to a large extent, recourse to this very knowledge for the knowledge configurations which they apply when they reveal the knowledge manifest in the texts to be interpreted or when they construct their models for interpretation. The complexity of this relationship becomes especially evident and can cause problems, when these three sorts of knowledge must be separated strictly for some specific purpose.

2.6. I do not want to treat the questions here, how to construct the meaning of expressions of any complexity out of the meanings of single words, and how derive further meanings from the meaning of the expressions.

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On the basis of these distinctions it is possible to introduce the concepts general thesaurus and text-specific thesaurus. A general thesaurus consists of a given language-specific lexicon and a (general) encyclopaedia, while a text-specific thesaurus consists of a text-specific lexicon and a text-specific encyclopaedia. The text-specific thesaurus can contain not only items which are compatible with the items of the general thesaurus, it can also contain completely idiosyncratic items. (The term 'encyclopedia' has been used here in a different sense than in PETÖFI (1976)).
3. The structure of a lexicon entry in general

Considering Putnam’s analysis concerning the term ‘meaning’ and my critical comment on this analysis, the macro-structure of a lexicon entry should expediently contain the following constituents (cf. Figure 3).

In the macro-structure of a lexicon entry as represented in Figure 3, the constituent lexicon item corresponds to the word/idiom explicated syntactically and semantically by the lexicon, the constituent form(ative) corresponds to the Putnamean syntactic markers, the constituent correlate to the Putnamean extension in the sense as I have reinterpreted it, and, finally, the constituent sense corresponds to the Putnamean semantic markers, stereotype, and extension together.

In the following paragraph I will discuss those pieces of information which must be assigned to the individual constituents of the lexicon entry. In so doing, I am aiming at neither completeness nor at theoretical adequacy in the representations. The sole function of the example is to illustrate the structure of the individual constituents.

3.1. A lexicon item is a word or an idiom of a natural language in written form (a so-called graphic item), to which it is expedient to assign the following information (cf. (2)):

(i) a phonetic representation indicating pronunciation, stress, and word division, etc.,
(ii) specification of those registers in which the lexicon item can occur as an element (i.e. stylistic level, sociolect, dialect). It is also necessary to specify those technical sub-languages, in which the item is used as a technical term,
(iii) a list of items which in some register or technical sub-language have a synonymous or antonymous relation to the item concerned,
(iv) idiomatic expressions.
### Figure 3

The macro-structure of a lexicon entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lexicon item</th>
<th>form(ative)</th>
<th>correlate</th>
<th>sense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>denotans</td>
<td>= denotatum/</td>
<td>= designatum/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>designans</td>
<td>denotandum</td>
<td>designandum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**denotans**
- denotatum
- denotandum

**designans**
- designatum
- designandum

** explicandum = exp explicans**
** or **
** definiendum = definiens**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>filter</th>
<th>[[...fa][filter]] {sp: x}</th>
<th>[[...fa][f018] {sp: x}</th>
<th>[[...fa][filter]} {sp: x}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>writes</td>
<td>[[...fa][writes]} {cp: x, eo: y, im: z}</td>
<td>[[...fa][f417] {cp: x, eo: y, im: z}</td>
<td>[[...fa][writes]} {cp: x, eo: y, im: z}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The structure of a lexicon entry

(2) filter
(i) /fil-tə/
(ii) term in
chemistry, engineering, photography, physics;
(iii) ?
(iv) on the subject of

3.2. The kernel of the representation of the form(ative) constituent — considered both as denotans and as designans (cf. Figure 3) — should be a canonical semantico-syntactic representation. The two reasons, for which I think that this representation should be constructed by means of a canonical language are the following: (1) the application of a canonical language renders it possible for the lexicon-entries of natural languages to obtain one and the same micro-structure, and (2) the application of a canonical language can also guarantee the explicit representation of the information concerning the possible grammatical combinations of the single words (more exactly: elementary structures).

The elementary structure of the canonical representation is a functor + argument structure, in which the functor can be specified by a specifier of any complexity (cf. formula (3)).

\[(\forall M \exists \exists L_1 \exists L_n \exists f_1 \exists f_n \exists \{r_1 : a_1, ..., r_n : a_n\})\]

6 In the following paragraphs I operate with elementary structures of the canonical language of the so-called ‘text-structure world-structure theory’. As to this theory, cf. BiAsCi-FRiTSCHE (1978), HEyDRiCH-PetoFI (1981), PetoFI (1981), (1983a), (1983b) and (1983c).
The explication of the elements of this formula is the following:

The part in the square brackets ‘[ ]’ indicates the specified functor-part, while the part in the braces ‘{ }’ indicates the argument-part.

The symbol ‘f’ stands for functors: nouns, verbs, and conjunctions in the terminology of traditional grammar.

The symbol ‘fd’ stands for dimensifiers: they are nouns which denote the dimensions with respect to which a particular functor can be specified. Dimensions are e.g.: number, weight, volume, length, width, height, acceleration, speed, shape, colour, smell, taste, touch, sound, temperature.

The symbol ‘fm’ stands for measure-indicators: they are nouns (or nominal structures) which denote the units in which the measure of the property denoted by the dimensions can be measured. E.g.: piece, pair, group, g, kg, ton, cubic cm, cubic meter, liter, square meter, km, mile, centigrade, km/hour, etc.

The symbol ‘Ql’ stands for quality indicators: they are adjectives or adverbs which denote properties (in the widest sense of the word). They often indicate the dimension too. Quality indicators are e.g.: horizontal, vertical, red, blue, loud, smooth, rough, cold, warm, good, bad, great, little, fast, slow, etc.

The symbol ‘Qn’ stands for quantity indicators: they are numbers and indefinite numerals which function as coefficients at the measure-indicators.

The symbol ‘M’ stands for modifiers. Modifiers can have a specific internal structure which I do not want to discuss here in detail.

Brackets with a dot on top of them indicate that their content is optional, i.e. it can be left out without running the risk of destroying the canonical well-formedness of the functor + argument structure. In the case of quality indicators, for which there exist no measure-indicators in a given language,
the measure-indicators are to be substituted by a dummy-element (a measure-indicating hyperonymous element) in the formula.

The symbols ‘$r_i$’ stand for argument-role indicators. These indicators have a similar function as the deep cases in case grammar, they are, however, introduced by means of definitions.

The symbols ‘$a_i$’ stand for argument-indices, also called co-reference indices.

It is expedient to assign the following information to the representation of the form(ative) constituent (cf. (4a), (4b)):

(i) a phonological representation,
(ii) natural-language specific syntactic categories,
(iii) semantic (classificatory) categories.

(4a) $[[[... f_d ] \langle \text{filter} \rangle] \{ sp : x \}$

(i) filter$_{PhR}$
(ii) noun noun
syn.$c_i$ syn.$c_k$

(iii) sem.$c_j$ sem.$c_m$ or

(4b) $[[[... f_d ] \langle \text{writes} \rangle] \{ cp : x, \ eo : y, \ im : z \}$

(i) write$_{PhR}$
(ii) noun verb $\varnothing$ $\varnothing$ with
syn.$c_i$ syn.$c_k$ (case$_i$) (case$_j$) (case$_k$)

(iii) sem.$c_j$ sem.$c_m$ or $o_s$ $o_v$

The symbols in the example of representations (4a) and (4b) are to be read as follows:

‘$f_d$’: dimensifier-variable;
‘$\langle \text{filter} \rangle$’ and ‘$\langle \text{writes} \rangle$’: formatives as functor;
$x, y, z$: object variables;
‘$sp$’, ‘$cp$’, ‘$eo$’, ‘$im$’: argument role indicators;

e.g.: ‘$cp$’ indicates the role of the object that writes;
‘$eo$’ indicates the role of the object which comes into being as the result of writing;
‘$im$’ indicates the role of the object, by means
of which the writing has been carried out; ‘sp’ indicates the role of the object that is in a (specific) state;
the subscript ‘PhR’ refers to the phonological representation;
‘nouns’ and ‘verbs’ indicate natural-language specific syntactic categories;
the symbols ‘c\alpha’ indicate different syntactic /syn/ or semantic /sem/ subclasses;
‘with’ indicates a preposition, ‘\varnothing’ the lack of prepositions;
the symbols ‘(case\beta)’ indicate the case — where it is necessary;
the symbols ‘o\lambda’ indicate object classes.

3.3. Rather than to present a detailed discussion of how to indicate the correlate (denotatum/denotandum), I will only comment on one aspect of correlate indication.

The role of a correlate indicator can be fulfilled by an element (a constant) standing for (pointing deictically to) the correlate. This ensures the representation of the fact that in a given communication situation the participants in the communication are speaking about one and the same object without necessarily having the same knowledge/opinion as to what the object actually is (more exactly, what properties it has).

In Figure 3 the symbols ‘f018’ and ‘f417’ function as correlate indicators. These indicators can be considered as the functor-part of the same canonical elementary structures, by means of which the form(ative) constituents have been represented. If we proceed like this, we have the possibility to construct complex indicators out of elementary correlate indicators in the same way as to construct complex representations out of elementary formatives or sense representations. However, as to this question, I do not want to enter into a more detailed discussion.

3.4. The representation of the sense (designatum/designandum, explication/definition) is the representation of the common-
sense knowledge of the average speaker and the technical knowledge of the experts in the given language community.

It is expedient to represent the sense as two different sets of knowledge even if in most cases single persons have a specific configuration of elements taken from both sets of knowledge in their knowledge about the object/state of affairs concerned.

In the formal respect, the representation of the elementary constituents of these two sets of knowledge is the same kind of canonical representation as in the canonical representation of the form. In order to guarantee that different natural-language texts can be compared adequately, it would be expedient to represent these sets of knowledge not only by means of natural-language specific elements, but also by means of a language (of an interlingua) that is canonical also in the semantic respect.

The representation of the individual subsets of the commonsense knowledge and of the experts' knowledge must have a well-defined macro-structure. This means that it is necessary to define those categories for all object/state of affairs classes with respect to which the elements of the given class are to be characterized.

To one of the classes of these categories belong those categories which have to correspond to the semantic markers in the sense of Putnam. It is plausible that with respect to one and the same object or state-of-affairs class the role of the semantic markers within the common sense knowledge and within the different expert knowledges can be fulfilled by different categories.

To another class of these categories belong those categories which constitute the macro-structure of the explicans-part of the explications. Let us consider some examples:

(a) Pineapple, apple, apricot, banana etc. should be characterized within the commonsense knowledge sector with reference to the following categories: class (genus proximum),
parent plant, native climate, shape, colour, taste, seed-type, characteristics of fruit-pulp, characteristics of outer surface, manner of harvesting, etc.

(b) Railway station, airport, and seaport should be characterized within the commonsense knowledge sector with reference to the following categories: class (genus proximum), transportation category, purpose, installations, vehicle of transportation, etc.

Finally, concerning the structure of the explicans/definiens, it is important to consider how circularity can be avoided. In other words, we must consider how to select the elements of the language of explication (i.e. those elements which are not to be explicated, but defined or taken as semantic primitives within the lexicon). At the same time, the lexicon must contain information about how these elements may be paraphrased in the given natural language. This information must, however, be distinguished unambiguously from the explicantia/definiens. (Cf. Neubauer, 1980; Heydrich, 1981).

3.5. The relations represented in Figure 3 are to be read by means of the definitorically introduced formulae (cf. the representations in the bottom of Figure 3) as follows.

denotation:

With reference to the lexicon item filter:

if (at a given time interval \( t \) in a given place \( l \) in the opinion of a given language community) the (one-element) extensional relation ‘\( f018 \)’ applies to an object \( x \) with the role \( sp \), this relation will be called \( \langle \text{filter} \rangle \) by the given language community at the given interval \( t \) in the given place \( l \). (This means expressed quite simply: if the object \( x \) belongs to the object class \( f018 \), this object \( x \) will be called ‘filter’).

Since, according to Putnam’s conception of indexicality, the denotans denotes the denotatum indexical, this relation
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can also be read by inverting the two constituents of the relation:

if the (one-element) relation applying to an object \( x \) with the role \( sp \) is called \(<\text{filter}>\) (by a given language community at a given time interval \( t \) in a given place \( I \)), this relation is (at the given time interval \( t \) in the given place \( l \) in the opinion of the given language community) the (one-element) *extensional* relation \('f018'\).

The case is similar with reference to the lexicon item 'write' (considered here only one of its readings):

if (at a given time interval \( t \) in a given place \( l \) in the opinion of a given language community) the (three-element) *extensional* relation \('f417'\) applies to an object \( x \) with the role \( sp \), to an object \( y \) with the role \( eo \), and to an object \( z \) with the role \( im \), this relation will be called \(<\text{writes}>\) (by the given language community at the given time interval \( t \) in the given place \( l \)).

designation:

With reference to the lexicon item *filter*:

if (at a given time interval \( t \) in a given place \( l \) in the opinion of a given language community) the (one-element) *sense*-relation \('<\text{filter}>'\) applies to an object \( x \) with the role \( sp \), this relation will be called \(<\text{filter}>\) (by the given language community, at the given time interval \( t \) in the given place \( l \)). (In another words, simply expressed, — using the implicit sense representation \('<\text{filter}>'\) —, this means that if the object \( x \) has the property 'being a filter', this object \( x \) will be called 'filter').

According to Kripke's conception of the rigid designator, this relation can also be read by inverting the two constituents:

if the (one-element) relation applying to an object \( x \) with the role \( sp \) is called 'filter' (by a given language community at a given time interval \( t \) in a given place \( l \)), this relation is (at the given time interval \( t \) in the place \( l \) in the opinion of the given language community) the (one-element) *sense* relation 'filter'.
The designation relations can be interpreted similarly with reference to the lexicon item *write*, too.

**explication:**

With reference to the lexicon item *filter* (assuming that the word 'filter' is not a definitorically introduced technical term; in the latter case, the lexicon item of the sublanguage, in which 'filter' is a definitorically introduced technical term, contains a definition, not an explication, for which analogously applies what follows about the explication):

if (at a given time interval $t$ in a given place $l$ in the opinion of a given language community) the (one-element) *sense* relation 'filter' applies to an object $x$ with the role $sp$, also the following sense relations will apply to this object $x$ (at the given time interval $t$ in the given place $l$ in the opinion of the given language community): ... (Since this relation is an explication relation, it would lose its validity by inverting its constituents. This does not apply to the definitions).

The explication relation can be interpreted similarly with reference to the lexicon item *write*, too.

### 3.6. The structure of an entry of an *encyclopaedia* can be constructed analogously to that of the entries of a lexicon:

1. as an encyclopaedia item is to be considered that name or expression (consisting in most cases of more than one word) which indicates the object or state of affairs to be described in the encyclopaedia;

2. the structure of the syntactic markers is identical with that of the lexicon items; an encyclopaedia contains presumably only name, noun, and nominal phrase items;

3. correlates are indicated also in an encyclopaedia by means of correlate indicators;

4. the sense representations in an encyclopaedia differ from the constituents of the sense representation of lexicon entries in the following respects:
— an encyclopaedia will seldom contain pieces of information to be reckoned to the so-called layman stereotypes; (this will only happen in cases where there exists a ‘naive belief-system’ concerning the object or state of affairs in question);
— the explicans component of the explications only has to provide information as to the technical explication, the explicantia belonging to the language knowledge can be found in the lexicon.

4. *Some aspects of a text-specific lexicon entry*

There are two purposes conceivable, for which a text specific thesaurus can be constructed: (1) to construct merely this thesaurus, e.g. in order to compile an explanatory dictionary of work \( \text{W}_1 \) of author N.N., or (2) for the purpose of constructing one of the components of the explicative interpretation of a given text. In the first case it is in general not necessary to compare the text specific thesaurus to the lexicon of the language in question and to a general encyclopaedia in any way, while in the second case this is generally necessary, since one of the tools of the interpretation build in fact this lexicon together with this encyclopaedia. When discussing the aspects of a text-specific thesaurus, I will concentrate on the second case, and for simplicity’s sake, I will be concerned here with questions of the lexicon.

4.1. When constructing the entries of a text-specific lexicon, the *first* task consists in finding that entry in the lexicon of the given language which has a sense-representation constituent suitable for the construction of the text-specific sense representation of the given word occurring in the given co-text of the text.
Let us consider e.g. the following utterances 7:

(5) Er hat die Sprache verloren
    [He has lost language]

(6) Uwe kann fünf Sprachen
    [Uwe has command of five languages]

(7) Sprache gibt dieser Lautsprecher einwandfrei wieder; bei Musik läßt er zu wünschen übrig
    [This loud-speaker is excellent for language; however, for music it leaves much to be desired]

(8) Die Sprache der Bienen wurde genau erforscht
    [The language of the bees has been throughly investigated]

(9) Der Artikel ist in einer schwierigen Sprache geschrieben
    [This article has been written in a difficult language]

(10) Er war an seiner Sprache zu erkennen
    [He could be recognized by his language]

(11) Die Sprache spielt in unserem Leben eine wichtige Rolle
    [Language plays an important role in our life].

Let us assume that, concerning the item Sprache ['language'] the lexicon of the given language differentiates between the following sense 8 (cf. (12)).

(12) (a) a system of sounds produced by means of breath and speech organs of man in order to express thoughts, emotions, will, etc., an important means of communication of people with each other;

(b) a system of sounds of a human community (the official language of a country; national language);

(c) the way of speaking of those having the same profession or belonging to the same social community (language of the miners, language of the businessman, cant, secret language);

7 The examples have been taken from Schwarze (1975) (p. 15).
8 The enumerated senses can be found in the entry ‘Sprache’ of G. Wahrig, Deutsches Wörterbuch.
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(d) ability to speak;
(e) a system of gestures, signs, serving communication (language of gestures, language of deaf and dumb, sign language);
(f) the way of expressing oneself in written or spoken form, style;
(g) a system of sound and signals of animals (animal language, language of dogs, language of birds).

If we only regard the direct meaning, the following sense can be assigned to the single utterances (cf. (5)-(11) and (12), respectively):

(13) (5) (d)
(6) ? and/or (e)
(7) ?
(8) (g)
(9) (f)
(10) (f) / (b) / x
(11) (a)

It is easy to recognize that none of the sense (a)-(g) can be assigned to the utterances (6) and (7).

The symbol ‘x’ assigned to (10) beyond (f) and (b) indicates that this utterance can also be understood to refer to the way of articulation/timbre/prosody specific for the ‘he’ in question; this sense, however, has not been mentioned among the senses (a)-(g).

With respect to this analysis it can be disregarded how the lexicon of a particular language distinguishes between the enumerated sense, i.e. whether it constructs individual items according to the single senses, or it assigns all of these senses to one item. (This latter is the case with the lexicon considered).

(13) represents, however, something different than what I have mentioned as the first task in the introductory part of 4.1. The very results complying with the first tasks are represented in (14).
The elements of (14) are to be read in the following way: the formative \langle Sprache \rangle occurring in the co-text '5' can/should be assigned the implicit sense representation \text{Sprache}_a; the lexicon does not contain an implicit sense representation assignable to the formative \langle Sprache \rangle that occurs in the co-text '6', etc.

4.2. The second task is, on one hand, to construct new sense representations (at least in the form of an implicit sense as explicandum and a rudimentary explicans) in place of the sense representations that are not to be found in the lexicon, on the other hand, to choose those explicans parts from the single explications which to the mind of the interpreter are to be assigned to the given formatives in the given co-texts.

Considering the previous examples, the first part of the second task means to construct the following sense representations (cf. (12')).

(12') (h) a system of sounds (chains of sound) produced by means of breath and speech organs of man (and/or written signs) which serve on the basis of the convention valid within a given language community for expressing thoughts, emotions, will, etc. (German, French, English, etc.);

(i) a verbal chain of sound produced by one single person (or group of persons);

These sense representations render it possible to complement (14) in the following way (cf. (14')).

(14') \langle Sprache \rangle_8 ' \text{Sprache}_a', and/or ' \text{Sprache}_e'

\langle Sprache \rangle_7 ' \text{Sprache}_l'
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In connection with \( \langle \text{Sprache}\rangle_6 \) it has to be mentioned that if the languages, of which Uwe has command of, also include a programming language (or in the given co-text only programming languages are concerned), one has either to construct a sense representation (j) too, or the sense representation (h) has to be complemented/ altered.

The second part of the second task is to specify the sense-representation corresponding to the given co-text. Let us consider some here relevant examples.

(15) (a) With respect to the formative \( \langle \text{Sprache}\rangle_9 \) it has to be cleared, whether the loss of the physical/physiological or that of the psychic ability is meant in the given co-text (if it is at all possible to clear this question, i.e. whether we find information about it in this or in a following co-text). — If we succeed in clearing this question, the sense representation \(' \text{Sprach}_a'\) has to be complemented with respect to this alternative;

(\(\delta\)) Where (14) or (14') contains alternatives, it has to be decided, if possible, which of the alternatives (or which combination of them) and which explicans-part are meant;

(\(\gamma\)) In the given co-text it is possibly sufficient to assign the following part of the explicans belonging to \(' \text{Sprach}_a'\) to the formative \(\langle \text{Sprache}\rangle_{11} \): 'important means of communication of people with each other'.

Concerning a particular co-text for a given formative, only such an explication part of the sense-representation assignable to it has to be choosen, which the implicit sense representation designated by the given formative without doubt implies.

4.3. The examples analysed in section 4.2 show that in general in the course of the explicative interpretation of texts the following operations should be carried out upon the lexicon entries:
— construction of such implicit sense-representations and of explicantia assignable (to be assigned) to them, which are not contained in the given lexicon (cf. (12'));
— complementation of the explicantia contained by the lexicon by new explicans-parts (cf. (15) (x));
— choice of appropriate parts/configurations of the explicantia contained by the lexicon (cf. (15) (γ) and (15) (β)).

In addition to these, in many cases the following two operations will have to be carried out, too:
— inclusion of new items into the lexicon and the construction of entries in accordance with them;
— metaphorical/symbolical explication of lexicon items.

The basic requirement concerning the macro-structure of the lexicon (and, accordingly, of the encyclopaedia) entries is to render it possible to carry out these operations in an optimal way.

4.4. All considerations in the previous sections concerning a text-specific lexicon constructed on the basis of comparing a text and a given (language specific) lexicon applies mutatis mutandis to the construction of a text-specific encyclopaedia on the basis of a general encyclopaedia.

In addition, the results of the above analysis can mutatis mutandis also be interpreted with respect to the construction of a text-specific lexicon (and encyclopaedia) which is (are) to be constructed independently of a given language-specific lexicon (and in a given general encyclopaedia).

In whatever way we establish a text-specific lexicon (or encyclopaedia) the main task as to the structure of this lexicon (encyclopaedia) is to investigate, how the single co-text-specific explicantia assigned to a given formative can be united (if at all) to one single text-specific explicans.

If we interpret texts on the basis of a given lexicon (and encyclopaedia), the entries of the text-specific lexicon (and encyclopaedia) constructed in the course of the interpretation...
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must subsequently be analysed in order to find out, to which extent the text-specific entries are idiosyncratically text-specific and to which extent they can be used to complement/correct the lexicon (encyclopaedia) underlying the analysis.

If the aim is to construct an explanatory thesaurus of the works of a particular author, this thesaurus should, expediently, be later analysed as to its relation to the thesaurus of other (contemporary, earlier or later living) authors, and/or to the thesaurus of the natural language used by him.

5. Possible ways of defining the concept 'lexicon item'

In the previous sections of this paper, I have attempted at finding an answer to the first four questions formulated in the Introduction: (a) What is the very nature of 'word meaning'? (b) Is it expedient and necessary to distinguish between lexicon and encyclopaedia, and if the answer is positive, how to do it? (c) What kind of a relation exists between the lexicon of a language (and a general encyclopaedia) and a text-specific lexicon (and a text-specific encyclopaedia)? and (d) How should the optimal macro and micro structure of a lexicon entry be set up? The answer I could provide are necessarily of fragmentary nature. Only a working team could achieve more by constructing, on one hand, at least a minimal lexicon for a given language that meets the requirements outlined previously, and, on the other hand, by trying to construct at least one text-specific lexicon according to these requirements. Only the experiences made in the course of these works could bolster a number of the theoretical statements.

I have consciously not treated the last question formulated in the Introduction yet, the question concerning the possibilities, the answers to the first four questions offer for the definition of the concept of 'lexicon item'. I want to deal now briefly with this question.
5.1. I have provided the following explication of lexicon item in point 3.2: a lexicon item is a word or an idiom of a natural language in a written form (a so-called graphic item). This explication cannot be considered adequate before having answered the question, how to understand in this explication the terms ‘word’ and ‘idiom’. To define these terms — and through their definition to define the term ‘lexicon item’ — there can be conceived four possibilities (if we start out of the macro structure of a lexicon entry described in section 3) where either (1) the graphemes of the natural language to be explicated, or (2) the graphemes and the canonical syntactic structures to be assigned to them as formatives, or (3) the correlates, or (4) the sense representations can be considered as the respective dominating factor.

5.2. These four possibilities should be commented on in the following paragraphs.

5.2.1. As to the first possibility, I only want to point out that it can be considered both as a totally formal and as a not totally formal possibility. In the first case, one has to define first a syntactic basic form with respect to each part of speech of the given language, and to consider each different grapheme representing a basic form as a lexicon item, without regard to the possibility that language elements manifesting themselves in the given graphemes can belong to different parts of speech, there can be a homonymous or polysemous relation between them, etc. In this case, further differentiation has to take place in the remaining constituents of the lexicon entry. In the second case, the definition of the lexicon item is already effected on the basis of some aspect of this further differentiation, independently of the graphematic identity. This is, in fact, how lexicographical practice generally works.

5.2.2. As a lexicon-item constituting element can be considered a grapheme and the canonical representation (the functor +
argument structure represented in (3)) assigned to it as to a formative together. Here the fact of decisive importance is, to which canonical category of the functor part the grapheme in question belongs (i.e. whether it is a functor, a dimensifier, a measure-indicator, a quality-indicator, a quantity-indicator, or a modifier), and if it is a functor, how many and what kind of argument-role indicators have the argument frames which constitute the possible argument-parts belonging to it. It is imaginable that when defining the 'lexicon item' we only consider the structure of the functor-part as being of decisive importance, while the possible argument-parts will be considered as means of further differentiation within one and the same item; this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of some other further differentiation within the remaining constituents of the given entry.

5.2.3. The correlates can be considered as lexicon-item constituting elements on the basis of the principle 'one correlate-one item'. Those language elements which can be regarded in referential respect as identical would become in this case one single item in the lexicon, despite their graphematic differences. The consequences of this type of lexicon item constitution concerning the formative and the possible variety of the canonical representation assigned to them would require a separate analysis.

5.2.4. As lexicon-item constituting elements can, finally, be considered the sense representations, both with respect to the non-expert-specific stereotypes and with respect to the expert-specific stereotypes, and with respect to possible configurations of these stereotypes. This way of definition is more specific than that mentioned in 5.2.2, because it is obvious that a formative and its canonical syntactic structure does not determine unambiguously any single possible sense structure. It also deviates from the way of definition treated in point 5.2.3. because of the non-definitory relation between sense and correlate.
5.3. Let us call the above discussed possibilities in the order in which they succeed one another the natural language aspect, the canonical syntactic aspect, the ontological aspect and the conceptual aspect of the conception of ‘lexicon item’. It is to my mind obvious that when lexicon entries are being differentiated, all aspects have to be taken into consideration. However, the question, which of these aspects (or which combination of them) to consider as being *definitional* for the concept of ‘lexicon item’, appears to me to be a pragmatical, not a theoretical question.

I think that none of the researchers concerned with word meaning and/or with lexicology/lexicography doubts that an optimal form of lexicographical practice has not yet been elaborated.

Since the canonical representation discussed in the present paper attempts at integrating the results of language philosophical, case-grammatical and ‘Valenz’-grammatical research, I am convinced that it is a suitable means for further clarification of some questions concerning word-meaning and lexicography.

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The structure of a lexicon entry


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