LA DEFINIZIONE ARISTOTELICA DI MOVIMENTO E LA CRITICA AI PREDECESSORI. ARISTOT. PHYS. III 2, 201B16-202A3

Francesca Masi

Abstract


In Physics, III 2, 201b16-202a3, Aristotle offers a negative argument in favour of his definition of change. Having previously stated what change is, he seeks confirmation for his theory in the dialectical examination of his predecessors’ conception of movement. Most commentators have neglected the passage, in part, because it is obscure and, in part, because, being postponed after the substantive discussion, it seems to be irrelevant to reconstruct Aristotle’s positive treatment of kinesis. But, criticizing his predecessors, evidently Aristotle is also providing some helpful criteria to correctly interpret his rather unclear and much discussed definition of motion. Therefore, the scope of this article is twofold. On a one hand, it attempts to use the negative argument in support of the relational interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of movement given by Monica Ugaglia. On the other hand, in the light of the relational interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of change, it seeks to solve some textual and exegetical problem of the negative argument itself and to identify its main target

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