IL PROBLEMA DELLA CONOSCENZA IN PIRRONE ED ENESIDEMO

Massimo Catapano

Abstract


In this paper, I shall attempt a brief reconstruction of the epistemological views of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus. For Pyrrho, I shall rely mainly on Aristocles’ testimony (Aristocl. ap. Eus., PE XIV 18, 1-5), whereas for Aenesidemus, I shall take into account the Sextan version of the ten and eight modes of suspension of judgment (PH, I, 35-163; 180-186). In this way, I intend to highlight some of the distinctive features of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

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Periodico iscritto al n. 216/2013 del Registro della Stampa del Tribunale Civile di Roma. Direttore responsabile: Antonio Lamarra - Condirettore: Roberto Palaia