Sulla necessità ipotetica delle sostanze naturali individuali in Aristotele

Sara Campanella


Abstract- Through this critical essay the subject of aristotelian natural teleologism is discussed in the light of its relation with hypothetical necessity which characterizes the physical world. This kind of necessity according that the relation between the antecedent (A) and subsequent (C) is not reversible so that if A, C but not if C, A, seems better to illuminate the reason for a priority of final cause in living beings. In particularly, our reasoning on natural teleologism will analyze the 'substantial change' which shows par eccelence the global unfolding of organism as a result of ousia’s movement without any occurrence to a sort of final determinism. In facts, teleologism seems to keep together organism as a totality throught the time and not all his single characteristics which could be also the result of materialistic and (consequently deterministic) causes. The difference between mixis and genesis help us to stress these intrinsic properties of living beings, i. e. irreducibility, conditioned necessity and irreversibility. Thus, aristotelian lesson on teleology instead of going toward a deterministic finalism of life, induce us to reflect that life is not a deduction by the form and necessity doesn’t concern the goal as it’s summed in De generatione et corruptione II.11 337b 30-35 and in De partibus animalium 639b 21-30.

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