Ancora sullo statuto veritativo della sensazione in Epicuro

Abstract

The main goals of this article are, on the one hand, to show the peculiar features of the Epicurean view of sense-perception (aisthesis), the first criterion of truth of Epicurus’ canonic; and, on the other hand, to critically discuss a recent contribution by Alexander Bown (“Epicurus on Truth and Falsehood”, Phronesis, 61 (4), 2016, p. 463-503), which deals with Epicurus’ double notion of truth (i.e. the truth of sense-perceptions/aistheseis and the truth of opinions/hypolepseis). Besides Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers and Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus, columns LXXII-LXXIII of PHerc. 1012 (including a work by the Epicurean philosopher Demetrius Lacon) and a passage from Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Logicians (M, VIII, 9) will be examined in order to explain the meaning of truth linked by Epicurus to perceptible objects (aistheta).

English title: Revisiting the truth value of sensation in Epicurus