Il problema della conoscenza in Pirrone ed Enesidemo

Authors

  • Massimo Catapano

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.19283/lph-2018.566

Keywords:

Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Ancient Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, Modes of Scepticism

Abstract

In this paper, I shall attempt a brief reconstruction of the epistemological views of Pyrrho and Aenesidemus. For Pyrrho, I shall rely mainly on Aristocles’ testimony (Aristocl. ap. Eus., PE XIV 18, 1-5), whereas for Aenesidemus, I shall take into account the Sextan version of the ten and eight modes of suspension of judgment (PH, I, 35-163; 180-186). In this way, I intend to highlight some of the distinctive features of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

 

English title: The problem of knowledge in Pyrrho and Enesidemus

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Published

07.12.2018

Issue

2018: Special Issue - Hellenistic Theories of Knowledge

Section

ARTICLES

License

Copyright (c) 2018 Massimo Catapano

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