Cogitatio e Res cogitans. La genesi della distinzione fra sostanza e attributo principale

Abstract

This article addresses the debated question of the relationship between substance and principal attribute by proposing a diachronic approach to its solution and, specifically, by tracing back to the Tertiae Responsiones the genesis of the distinction later formulated in the Principia philosophiae. Hobbes challenges Descartes for a categorical error in the inference from cogitatio to res cogitans, stigmatizing the use of naming res cogitans by abstract terms.
Descartes acknowledges the use, in the Meditationes, of a vocabulary of abstract terms, in particular, of cogitatio, to name the thinking subject, explaining his choice by the opportunity of distinguishing the essence of the thinking substance from that which does not pertain to it; however, in order to escape the categorical error denounced by Hobbes, he introduces a distinction, between res cogitans and cogitatio, as the ratio communis of ‘cogitative’ acts, which tacitly alters the approach of the Meditationes and initiates the transition to the ontology of the Principia.