Il concetto kantiano di esteriorità e la Seconda analogia dell'esperienza

Abstract

This study returns to one of the most controversial issues in Kantian exegesis, namely, the nature of the doctrine called by Kant Transzendentale Idealism (A 490/B 518) by Kant and. It aims to identify a key to the Kantian conception of external reality in the Second Analogy of Experience. To this end, three theses are proposed: 1) the Second Analogy of Experience, by achieving the task that in the Transcendental Deduction is not yet concluded, elaborates a third sense of object, which is reducible neither to mere representation nor to the thing in itself; 2) to this third sense of object corresponds a third sense of exteriority; 3) it thus turns out possible to attempt to integrate the interpretation of the concept of exteriority at work in the Refutation of Idealism in the light of the concept of object elaborated in the Second Analogy of Experience.

English title: The Kantian Concept of Exteriority and the Second Analogy of Experience