Grace and Predestination in the Early Wyclif

The Emergence of Soteriological Views in the De scientia Dei and Other Writings Composed around the Time of His Inceptio in Theology

Abstract

Wyclif’s doctrine of predestination has often been examined primarily for its political implications. This article aligns with studies that treat Wyclif’s soteriology as subject in its own right, focusing on his earlier theological writings. It concentrates in particular on the De scientia Dei, where Wyclif addresses predestination, grace and merit, free will, and divine reward or punishment from a distinctive theoretical perspective, asking whether an object of divine knowledge can cause that knowledge by existing in time. This enquiry gives rise to a set of characteristic positions, including the claim that rational agents can gain merit before God only de congruo, and a concurrentist model according to which meritum de congruo is the undivided effect of two total causes: divine grace and human free will. The article concludes by tracing the development of these ideas in the slightly later De dominio divino. Overall, Wyclif’s doctrine proves more nuanced than is commonly assumed.