Dalla parte di Giacobbe. Predestinazione, prescienza e provvidenza in Tommaso d’Aquino

Abstract

In Thomas Aquinas, the notion of predestination is structurally and inescapably linked, on the one hand, to that of foreknowledge (or divine science), and on the other, to that of providence. What I set out to do here is: first (§2), to outline in broad terms the way in which Aquinas defines the meaning of these terms in their reciprocal relation – with particular reference to the account provided in De veritate, q. VI; then (§§3-4), to show how, at least with regard to predestination and foreknowledge, Aquinas appeals to different models which – to put it in deliberately simplified terms – may be traced respectively to Augustine and to Boethius. It should be borne in mind, however, that Aquinas does not appear to have always maintained exactly the same position, especially with regard to the relation between predestination and merit. As for providence, Aquinas’s perhaps most significant move is his attempt to mitigate Aristotle’s general anti-determinism (§5). The thread that binds these notions together is an overarching orientation in which the margin of indeterminacy in the created order is virtually nil, and in which even human agency may ultimately be traced back, from a strictly compatibilist standpoint, to the immutable decisions of the divine will.

English title: On Jacob’s Side. Predestination, Foreknowledge, and Providence in Thomas Aquinas